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PICKING UP THE FLAG? THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 
FOOTBALL TEAM AND WHETHER INTERCOLLEGIATE 
STUDENT-ATHLETES MAY BE PENALIZED FOR 
EXERCISING THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
James Hefferan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2015, tensions were starting to rise at the University 
of Missouri after several racially charged incidents occurred at the 
school’s overwhelmingly white main campus in Columbia.  In Sep-
tember 2015, the African-American president of the Missouri Stu-
dent Association reported that he had been subjected to racial slurs 
from white students as he walked on campus.1  In October 2015, a 
student yelled a racial slur at members of the Legion of Black Colle-
gians as they were rehearsing for a play in a campus plaza.2  Later 
that month, someone smeared feces in the shape of a swastika on a 
dormitory restroom wall.3  The failure of the school administration to 
timely and adequately respond to these incidents only exacerbated 
the situation and led to a series of student protests.4  In the midst of 
this, an African-American graduate student, Jonathan Butler, began a 
hunger strike in which he refused to eat until the University Presi-
                                                          
*James J. Hefferan, Jr. grew up in Dearborn, MI, received a BA in Political Science, with highest dis-
tinction, from the University of Michigan in 1999, and a JD, magna cum laude, from Wake Forest Uni-
versity in 2003. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Law at the Charlotte School of Law, where he 
teaches Sales, Secured Transactions, Contracts, Contract Drafting, Amateur Sports Law, and Constitu-
tional Law. In his spare time, Professor Hefferan is a long- suffering sports fan, whose favorite teams 
are Wake Forest, the Detroit Lions, and all other Detroit professional teams. As of this writing, he has 
attended 194 consecutive Wake Forest football games, home and away, dating back to 2000. He would 
like to dedicate this Article to Colleen. 
1  Matt Ferner, Mizzou Football Coach On Backing Player Boycott: ‘I Did The Right Thing And I 
Would Do It Again’, HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mizzou-gary-pinkel-football-
boycott_us_56412a8ee4b0307f2caeb178; Brett McMurphy, Missouri player says many on team don’t 
support practice boycott, ESPN, Nov. 9, 2015, http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/14087454/missouri-tigers-player-says-team-not-united-practice-boycott.  
2  McMurphy, supra note 1. 
3  Id.; Morgan Winsor, Mizzou Coach Backs Protesting Players, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, Nov. 9, 2015, 
available at 2015 WLNR 33302221. 
4  McMurphy, supra note 1; Winsor, supra note 3. 
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dent, Timothy M. Wolfe, resigned.5  Seven days into his hunger 
strike, Butler expressed a willingness to die if Wolfe was not re-
moved,6 but the situation had failed to receive significant media at-
tention.  That would soon change. 
On Saturday evening, November 7, 2015, while most college 
sports fans concerned themselves with the results of that night’s 
prime time football games, Anthony Sherrils, a sophomore defensive 
back on the University of Missouri football team, posted a photo of 
thirty-one Missouri football players on Twitter, along with the fol-
lowing statement:  
 
The athletes of color on the University of Missouri foot-
ball team truly believe ‘Injustice Anywhere is a threat to 
Justice Everywhere.’  We will no longer participate in 
any football related activities until President Tim Wolfe 
resigns or is removed due to his negligence toward mar-
ginalized students’ experiences.  WE ARE 
UNITED!!!!!7 
 
As a result of the players’ boycott, the team’s Sunday scheduled 
practice was cancelled and doubts arose as to whether the school 
would field a team for its three remaining games.8  Later that day, 
during a meeting with athletic department officials, the players again 
made it clear that they did not intend to return to practice until Butler 
began eating.9 
The players’ actions soon produced the desired effect.  A media 
firestorm ensued, and by Monday, November 9, 2015, Wolfe had an-
nounced his resignation.10  Following Wolfe’s announcement, Butler 
ended his hunger strike, the players lifted their boycott, and the team 
returned to practice the next day in preparation for their upcoming 
game that Saturday night against Brigham Young University 
                                                          
5  Winsor, supra note 3; Ferner, supra note 1. 
6  Rick Maese & Kent Babb, Missouri players threaten boycott of football games, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/missouri-football-players-threaten-to-boycott-season-
amid-racial-tension/2015/11/08/5c11c456-8641-11e5-9a07-453018f9a0ec_story.html. 
7  Maese & Babb, supra note 6; see also Winsor, supra note 3. 
8  Maese & Babb, supra note 6. 
9  Id. 
10  Ferner, supra note 1; Dave Matter, Pinkel relates his view of protest, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/mizzou/pinkel-says-the-focus-was-on-saving-
a-man-s/article_27a636c7-63d4-5a18-a9eb-4b78ec82df0b.html. 
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(“BYU”) at Kansas City’s Arrowhead Stadium.11 
The situation at Missouri demonstrates the power of intercollegiate 
student-athletes to affect social and political change by exercising 
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  However, the 
players’ actions were not met with universal acclaim.  Some com-
mentators suggested that the boycotting players should have been 
kicked off the team.12  A Missouri state legislator even introduced a 
bill that would require state colleges to revoke the scholarship of any 
student-athlete who is healthy and refuses to play.13  The bill would 
have also revoked the scholarship of “any athlete who ‘calls, incites, 
supports or participates in any strike’” and fined coaches who en-
courage or enable such student protests.14 
Following media backlash, the bill in question was ultimately 
withdrawn.15 However, it raises the interesting question of whether 
intercollegiate student-athletes may lose their scholarships or other-
wise be penalized for participating in a political or social movement.  
In this particular situation, the Missouri athletic department publicly 
urged the campus to come together and never suggested any punitive 
measures or other negative impacts on the players involved in the 
boycott.16  Yet, in light of the negative reaction to the players’ ac-
tions from certain commentators, it is not unimaginable that a uni-
versity with a less-supportive coaching staff and/or administration 
might be inclined to attempt to discipline student-athletes who en-
gage in such activity.  This Article explores whether intercollegiate 
student-athletes may be penalized for exercising their First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech.  Part I explores the legal back-
ground on this issue.  Part II applies those precedents to the situation 
                                                          
11  Matter, supra note 10. 
12  Nick Visser, Fox Host Says He Would Have Replaced Mizzou Football Players, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/eric-bolling-mizzou-fox-news-the-
five_us_56414557e4b0411d30724f90 (quoting Eric Bolling, co-host of “The Five,” as stating: “I would 
say ‘Fine, goodbye.  We’ll find 25 or 30 new ball players to sit in.  We may lose the rest of the season. . 
. . I’ll take anyone on this team, hey I’ll take the basketball team.  You want to come play football?  
Hey, let’s go and see how it works out.”) 
13  Max Miceli, Missouri Legislators Back Bill to Strip Striking Student-Athletes of Scholarships, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 15, 2015), available at 2015 WLNR 37307671. 
14  Jim Suhr, Missouri bid to strip scholarships if athletes strike pulled, SE. MISSOURIAN (Dec. 16, 
2015), http://www.semissourian.com/story/2260068.html; see also Miceli, supra note 13. 
15  Suhr, supra note 14. 
16  Sarah Larimer, Are Missouri players in danger of losing their scholarships? Not likely, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/11/09/missouri-player-says-
many-players-coaches-dont-back-boycott-of-practices/. 
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at Missouri, concluding that while intercollegiate student-athletes are 
subject to greater restrictions of their constitutional rights than ordi-
nary college students, any attempt to penalize the Missouri football 
players for their actions would not have passed constitutional muster.  
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the Missouri situation 




This Part explores the intersection between the First Amendment 
and school-sponsored athletics, and is divided between cases arising 
in the college sports context and cases arising in the high school 
sports context.  Due to the differences between high school athletes 
and college athletes that will be discussed infra, the high school cas-
es are of lesser utility than the college cases.  However, due to the 
relative dearth of case law on the subject, as well as the tendency of 
some courts to import First Amendment standards from the second-
ary school context into the collegiate context, they do offer a certain 
amount of guidance for situations involving the free speech of inter-
collegiate student-athletes. 
A.  Freedom of Speech in the Context of Intercollegiate Athletics 
 1.  A Brief Detour into Contract Law 
Before addressing the First Amendment, it must be recognized that 
many aspects of the relationship between a university and its student-
athletes are contractual in nature.17 Student-athletes who receive 
scholarships sign a document, commonly referred to as a Statement 
of Financial Assistance, in which the university agrees to extend fi-
nancial aid in return for the student-athlete’s promise to attend the 
school and participate in athletics.18  If a student-athlete boycotts 
practices and/or games as part of a political or social statement, is he 
or she in breach of his or her contract with the university? 
While the terms of financial aid agreements may differ from 
school to school,19 pursuant to NCAA rules, a university may reduce 
                                                          
17 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992). 
18  MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 
105 (3d ed. 2013). 
19  Larimer, supra note 16. 
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or cancel a scholarship during its term if the student-athlete 
“[v]oluntarily (on his or her own initiative) withdraws from a sport at 
any time for personal reasons.”20  Thus, “students who receive col-
lege football scholarships have an affirmative duty to play foot-
ball,”21 and failure to participate will be considered a breach of the 
scholarship agreement, permitting the university to cancel the schol-
arship during its term.22   
The seminal case on this subject is Taylor v. Wake Forest Univer-
sity.23  There, plaintiff had received a scholarship from Wake Forest 
to play football.24  At the end of his first semester, plaintiff’s grade 
point average was below the minimum required by the school, so he 
did not participate in spring practice (nor was he eligible to) in order 
to improve his grades.25  Following plaintiff’s second semester, his 
grade point average exceeded the minimum required by the school 
and he was eligible to participate on the football team.26  However, 
plaintiff refused to participate on the football team during his soph-
omore year in order to continue to focus on his studies.27  At the end 
of plaintiff’s sophomore year, Wake Forest decided not to renew his 
scholarship due to his failure to participate in the football program.28  
After completing his junior and senior years at Wake Forest and re-
ceiving his degree, plaintiff sued the school for the expenses he in-
curred during those years in the absence of a scholarship.29 
The court rejected plaintiff’s claim.  It noted that, in exchange for 
                                                          
20  NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.3.4.2(d), at 196 (2015) [hereinafter 2015-16 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]; see also Mitten, supra note 18, at 105 (“A student-athlete’s right to con-
tinue to receive financial assistance is contingent on the athlete . . . participating in his or her sport.”); 
Adam Hoeflich, Note, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 581, 595 (1991) (“[A] school may cancel institutional financial aid during the period of the 
award if the recipient . . . voluntarily withdraws from a sport for personal reasons.”); Derek Quinn 
Johnson, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 96, 105 n.47 (1985) (observing that “the current rules permit a school to terminate a student’s 
scholarship should he cease to participate in the sport(s) for which the scholarship was awarded”). 
21  Otis B. Grant, African American College Football Players and the Dilemma of Exploitation, Racism 
and Education: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Sports Law, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 648 (2003).  
22  Daniel Nestel, Note, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University and the 
Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1413 (1992).  
23  191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1972). 
24  Id. at 380. 
25  Id. at 381. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 381–82. 
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the scholarship, plaintiff had agreed to maintain his athletic eligibil-
ity, “both physically and scholastically.”30  As long as his grade point 
average exceeded school requirements and he was academically eli-
gible, “[p]articipation in and attendance at practice were required.”31  
Wake Forest had complied with its contractual obligations by award-
ing plaintiff financial aid during his sophomore year; however, plain-
tiff had breached his contractual obligations to the school by refusing 
to participate and attend practice in the absence of injury or any other 
excuse other than to devote time to his studies.32 
As Taylor demonstrates, even though schools retain a “wide scope 
of power” to terminate a student-athlete’s scholarship during its term 
for voluntary withdrawal from a sport,33  most schools will continue 
to provide financial assistance for the remainder of the school year, 
and then simply elect not to renew the scholarship for another year.34  
Since, at least historically, athletic scholarships were only guaranteed 
for a one-year term, subject to renewal, and schools are given wide 
discretion when deciding whether to renew a scholarship, this still 
leaves student-athletes “easily expendable should conflict arise.”35  
Assuming that schools pursue the route of continuing to provide fi-
nancial aid to the student-athlete for the remainder of the year, while 
removing him or her from the team as a result of exercising his or her 
First Amendment rights, and then electing not to renew the scholar-
ship at the end of the school year, the analysis turns to whether such 
actions will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
2.  The First Amendment and Intercollegiate Athletics 
a. The Unique Situation of Student-Athletes 
Any analysis of the First Amendment rights of intercollegiate stu-
                                                          
30  Id. at 382. 
31  Id. 
32  Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 20, at 103 (“Taylor’s refusal to participate thus amounted to a 
breach of his contractual obligation.”). 
33  Nestel, supra note 22, at 1413 n.77. 
34  See, e.g., Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Kan. 1987); Taylor, 191 
S.E.2d at 381. 
35  Maxwell Strachan, Why the Mizzou Protests Are A Watershed Moment in Sports Activism, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/missouri-protests-
coach_us_564244a9e4b0307f2caf3cf2.  Beginning in 2012, the NCAA authorized universities to award 
multi-year scholarships of up to five years if they so choose. See also Mitten, supra note 18, at 111.  
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dent-athletes must begin with an acknowledgment that student-
athletes are “special and different” from ordinary college students, 
and, therefore, are subjected to different regulations of their speech 
than the student body at large.36  Speech by student-athletes is sub-
ject to greater regulation and scrutiny than ordinary college stu-
dents.37  This is so for two main reasons:  “(1) student athletes are 
highly regulated both on and off the field or court, and (2) team unity 
outweighs any unfettered right to free expression.”38 
“[S]tudent athletes are subject to more restrictions than the student 
body at large.”39  Indeed, “[c]ollege athletes are generally the most 
regulated students on campus.”40  By voluntarily agreeing to partici-
pate in a sport, student-athletes subject themselves to a myriad of 
regulations.41  Many of these regulations are physical in nature: 
 
[P]articipation in intercollegiate athletics, particularly in 
highly competitive postseason championship events, in-
volves close regulation and scrutiny of the physical con-
dition and bodily condition of student athletes.  Required 
physical examinations (including urinalysis), and special 
regulation of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activi-
ties that intrude significantly on privacy interests are 
routine aspects of a college athlete’s life not shared by 
other students or the population at large.42 
 
Beyond physical regulation, college athletes “are required to report 
to campus long before classes begin . . . and often must maintain a 
particular grade point average to remain on the team.  They must at-
tend study hall, have unique access to tutors and tutoring, and find 
                                                          
36  Meg Penrose, Tinkering with Success: College Athletes, Social Media and the First Amendment, 35 
PACE L. REV. 30, 46 (2014) [hereinafter Tinkering with Success]; Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Me-
dia and the Modern College Athlete, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 512 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter Outspoken].  
37  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 513. 
38  Id. at 546. 
39  Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007); Green v. Sandy, No. 5:10-cv-367-JMH, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2011); see also Tinkering with Success, supra 
note 36, at 35 (“For those schooled in constitutional rights, it should be clear that student-athletes are far 
more regulated than their traditional college counterparts.”). 
40  Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 43. 
41  Id. at 44; Outspoken, supra note 36, at 513. 
42  Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994). 
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themselves traveling the country, if not the world, in pursuit of ath-
letic competition.”43  As Professor Meg Penrose, herself a former 
Division I college athlete, explains: 
 
College athletes are often required to submit attendance 
reports to coaches or tutors while their more traditional 
college roommate sleeps the day away.  College athletes 
are often required to attend team meetings, study film 
and avoid classes that conflict with their practice or 
game schedules.  Their majors may be impacted by their 
sport and their sport’s travel schedule.  College athletes 
may be expected to take summer school and winter in-
tercession classes to open up their academic schedule for 
more early morning workouts or game-related travel.  
The schedules of college athletes are not theirs to 
choose.  Rather, that schedule is influenced, if not cho-
sen, by someone else whose focus is on the unique de-
mands of college studies on the student-athlete.44 
 
Furthermore, the NCAA requires that student-athletes “maintain a 
continued level of progress toward a degree.”45  Conference rules 
may mandate “good sportsmanship,” impose penalties for excessive 
celebration or taunting during athletic contests, and enforce policies 
regulating the use of social media.46 
As if they were not already subjected to a tremendous amount of 
regulation, college athletes are also likely to be subject to an athletic 
code of conduct imposed by their university’s athletic department, as 
well as various “team rules” imposed by their coach that regulate be-
havior and conduct both on and off campus.47  These regulations are 
often very restrictive of speech.48  Team rules may include “class at-
tendance and study hall requirements, bans on tobacco use, prohibit-
ing younger players from speaking to the press, random drug testing, 
gambling prohibitions such as playing fantasy football, grooming re-
strictions, proscribing derogatory language to describe teammates or 
                                                          
43  Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 43 (internal footnotes omitted). 
44  Id. at 45 (internal footnotes omitted). 
45  Id. at 44. 
46  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 523. 
47  Id. at 513. 
48  Id. at 513–14. 
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opponents, [and] nightly curfews [sic] requirements to avoid strip 
clubs and hiring strippers.”49  On top of all this, college athletes are 
often seen as role models, which require them to take on “a height-
ened sense of responsibility and exposure that traditional college stu-
dents never face.”50  In sum, by voluntarily participating in a heavily 
structured and regulated activity, college athletes subject themselves 
to greater restrictions on their conduct and speech than ordinary stu-
dents, and the constitutional analysis should reflect this.51 
Moreover, notwithstanding the degree of regulation to which stu-
dent-athletes subject themselves, the very nature of athletic competi-
tion is inimical to unfettered freedom of speech.  The playing field is 
very different from the classroom: 
 
One of the purposes of education is to train students to 
fulfill their role in a free society.  Thus, it is appropriate 
for students to learn to express and evaluate competing 
viewpoints.  The goal of an athletic team is much nar-
rower. . . . [T]he immediate goal of an athletic team is to 
win the game, and the coach determines how best to ob-
tain that goal.52 
 
Since the goal of sports is victory, not freedom, athletic competition 
places a higher ideal on the team than the individual.53  “Team unity, 
discipline, and onfield success are foremost among the goals of par-
ticipating in student-athletics.  Putting the rights of the individual be-
fore these athletic goals violates the underlying value of a team and 
allows the proverbial tail to wag the much more important dog.”54  
Surely a basketball coach whose team is down by one point in the fi-
nal seconds and who is attempting to draw up a game-winning play 
in the huddle should not be subjected to his players exercising their 
First Amendment rights to debate the merits of his strategy.  Distrac-
                                                          
49  Id. at 524; see also Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 43–44. 
50  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 524–25. 
51  Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 45; Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Public 
University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413, 424, 426–27 
(2012). 
52 Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Outspoken, supra note 36, at 544–
45. 
53 Outspoken, supra note 36, at 524. 
54 Id. at 539; see also Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591 (“A high school athletic team could not function smooth-
ly with an authority structure based on the will of the players.”). 
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tions must be kept to a minimum, and since they run counter to the 
goal of successful athletic performance, courts will provide coaches 
with far greater latitude than professors in restricting the free speech 
rights of their students.55 
To summarize, the circumstances discussed above reflect the con-
stitutional reality that courts will tolerate far greater restrictions on 
speech by college athletes than on speech by ordinary college stu-
dents.56  Courts “ha[ve] allowed state actions against student-athletes 
to stand even when those same actions would be unconstitutional if 
applied to non-student-athletes.”57  Indeed, “[t]he overriding message 
from the case law is that the student-athlete who speaks out about his 
or her problem may not be protected by the First Amendment and 
therefore must be willing to suffer the consequences, which can in-
clude the loss or curtailment of athletic participation or loss of an 
athlete [sic] scholarship.”58 
All of this is not to say, however, that the greater restrictions im-
posed upon college athletes completely immunizes state schools 
from First Amendment scrutiny of their policies relating to speech 
and expression.59  Deference to coaches and administrators does not 
mean abdication, and there are situations where, even taking into 
consideration the highly regulated nature of athletics, school officials 
overstep their constitutional bounds.60  If this is the case, then the 
proper analytical framework for making such a determination must 
be established. 
b.  The Tinker Standard 
The leading Supreme Court case on the regulation of student 
speech in the school setting is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.61  In Tinker, several junior and senior 
high school students were suspended for wearing black armbands to 
                                                          
55 Outspoken, supra note 36, at 524; Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 48–49. 
56 Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 45; Outspoken, supra note 36, at 541–42. 
57 Hauer, supra note 51, at 423. 
58  Diane Heckman, Educational Athletes and Freedom of Speech, 177 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 48 (2003). 
59  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 542.   
60  Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. 
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)); Outspoken, supra note 36, at 542; see also Lowery v. Euver-
ard, 497 F.3d 584, 600 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Of course, players do not completely waive their rights when 
they join a team: a coach could not dismiss a player simply because the player had religious or political 
views that were unpopular with his teammates.”). 
61  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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school to protest the Vietnam War, in violation of a district policy.62  
In striking down the policy, the Court made the oft-quoted statement 
that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”63  Even so, the Court also recognized “the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school 
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to 
prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”64 
In order to balance the competing concerns, the Court delineated 
the following standard for resolving student speech cases in the 
school context: 
 
A student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the class-
room hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the play-
ing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, 
he may express his opinions, even on controversial sub-
jects . . . , if he does so without “materially and substan-
tially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school” and without 
colliding with the rights of others.  But conduct by the 
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, 
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of speech.65 
 
In making this determination, “undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of ex-
pression.”66  In order to justify the prohibition of a particular opinion, 
the state “must be able to show its action was caused by something 
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”67  Applying this 
standard to the case before it, the Court found that wearing the arm-
                                                          
62  Id. at 504. 
63  Id. at 506. 
64  Id. at 507. 
65  Id. at 512–13 (internal citation omitted). 
66  Id. at 508. 
67  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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bands did not cause a substantial interference with the work of the 
school or infringe on the rights of others; therefore, it constituted 
protected expression under the First Amendment.68 
c.  Should the Tinker Standard Apply to College Athletes? 
It must always be remembered that Tinker arose in a primary and 
secondary educational context.  The Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly extended Tinker to speech occurring on college campuses.69  
On occasion, the Court has referenced Tinker and its progeny for 
guidance in analyzing certain types of campus speech.70  In other 
cases, however, the Court has indicated that speech restrictions in the 
college setting should be evaluated differently than speech re-
strictions in the high school setting.71  This has caused a certain 
amount of confusion among lower courts.72 
As will be seen infra, some of the lower courts faced with litiga-
tion regarding the First Amendment rights of college student-athletes 
have referenced the Tinker standard for guidance.73  Other courts ad-
dressing the speech rights of ordinary college students have been 
even more overt in adopting the Tinker standard as the proper analyt-
ical framework.  For instance, in Tatro v. University of Minnesota,74 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, while acknowledging “that what 
constitutes a substantial disruption in a primary school may look very 
                                                          
68  Id. at 509, 514. 
69  Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 53–54; Zak Brown, Note, What’s Said in This Locker 
Room, Stays in This Locker Room: Restricting the Social Media Use of Collegiate Athletes and the Im-
plications for Their Institutions, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 426 (2012); Meggen Lindsay, 
Note, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-Speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-
Secondary Students–Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1473, 1480 
(2012); see also J. Wes Gay, Note, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete Social Media Bans 
Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 789 (2012) (“The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
addressed whether a college student’s speech should be protected more, less, or no differently than a 
high school student’s speech.”). 
70  Brown, supra note 69, at 427, 429; Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1480.  See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 
U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (quoting Tinker but not applying it in a college speech case). 
71  Brown, supra note 69, at 427, 429; Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1481.  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[Our] cases 
dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been con-
fined to high schools . . . whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least 
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education.”). 
72  See Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1480. 
73  See, e.g., Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 430–32 (10th Cir. 1971); Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of 
Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987). 
74  800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. App. 2011). 
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different in a university,” found “no practical reason” not to adopt 
the Tinker substantial-disruption standard in the college context, and 
applied it to determine whether a university had acted properly in 
disciplining student expression.75 
Other courts have “consistently recognized a higher level of 
speech for college students.”76  These decisions recognize that “there 
is a difference between the extent that a school may regulate student 
speech in a public university setting as opposed to that of a public el-
ementary or high school,” so courts “must proceed with greater cau-
tion before imposing speech restrictions on adult students at a college 
campus.”77  Courts and commentators have expounded a multitude of 
reasons for treating college students differently from high school 
students in the First Amendment context. 
First, the pedagogical missions of colleges and high schools are 
fundamentally different.78  “While both seek to impart knowledge, [a 
college] encourages inquiry and challenging a priori assumptions 
whereas [a high school] prioritizes the inculcation of societal values.  
Public universities encourage teachers and students to launch new 
inquiries into our understanding of the world.”79  Moreover, high 
school educators and administrators act in loco parentis80 over their 
students, most of whom are minors, while “[p]ublic university ad-
ministrators, officials, and professors do not hold the same power 
over students.”81  Primary and secondary school students “have 
widely different levels of emotional maturity and brain develop-
                                                          
75  Id. at 821. 
76  Gay, supra note 69, at 789. 
77  DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2008); see also McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 
618 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2010). 
78  McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243. 
79  Id. 
80  In loco parentis, literally “in the place of a parent,” is the doctrine pursuant to which an administra-
tive body such as a school acts as a temporary guardian of the children entrusted to its care. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).  
81  McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243–44; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1482–83. (“College professors and administrators do not stand in for stu-
dents’ parents.  Therefore, the in loco parentis relationship that elementary, middle, and high schools 
have with students, and that can justify restricting speech that undercuts the values that those schools 
are trying to indoctrinate, cannot justify such restrictions at the college level.”) (internal footnote omit-
ted); Tracey Wirmani, Note, Tinker Takes on Tatro: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Missed Oppor-
tunity, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 769, 793 (2013) (“[T]he Tinker standard was formulated with primary and 
secondary students in mind and is premised on the in loco parentis theory; thus, it is not applicable in 
the university context.”). 
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ment”82 which administrators must take account of when determining 
what information should be disseminated to them.83  On the other 
hand, “[c]onsiderations of maturity are not nearly as important for 
university students, most of whom are already over the age of 18 and 
entrusted with a panoply of rights and responsibilities as legal 
adults.”84  Presumably, the higher maturity level of such students will 
leave them less impressionable and allow them more freedom than 
minor students.85 
Based on the above considerations, many courts and commentators 
have asserted that college students have broader free speech rights 
than high school students.  Certain speech that may be prohibited to 
minors in high school may not be prohibited to adult college stu-
dents.86  Discussion by college students should not be restricted 
“based solely on rationales propounded specifically for the restriction 
of speech in public elementary and high schools.”87  College admin-
istrators should have less leeway in regulating student speech than 
elementary and secondary school administrators.88  Indeed, several 
commentators have argued that Tinker should be wholly inapplicable 
to the college setting.89  While no court has gone that far, the Third 
                                                          
82  Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1481. 
83  McCauley, 618 F.3d 232, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). 
84  Id.; see also Brown, supra note 69, at 426 (recognizing that most college students are adults “and 
free speech is considered a cornerstone of the university experience”); Outspoken, supra note 36, at 543 
(recognizing that college students are traditionally considered adults); Wirmani, supra note 81, at 784 
(acknowledging that “most college students are adults and should not be treated as juveniles”). 
85  Brown, supra note 69, at 423; cf. Gay, supra note 69, at 791 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
treated high school and college students differently, based on age and maturity level, in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence).  
86  McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2010); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 
301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008); Gay, supra note 69, at 804 (“College students are more mature and their 
speech should not be restricted to the same extent as high school students.”); Hauer, supra note 51, at 
422 (“[T]he Court has historically granted college students greater speech protection than high school 
students.”); Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1481 (“Students enrolled at public universities should have a 
greater degree of free-speech protection than high school and junior high students.”); Karyl Roberts 
Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of 
High School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 200 (2003) (“What constitutes ‘material and substantial 
disruption’ may be different in the university, as opposed to the secondary school, setting. . . . [A] court 
could conclude that conduct which may disrupt teaching in a high school would not be disruptive in the 
college environment.”); Wirmani, supra note 81, at 780 (“[C]ourts have long recognized that First 
Amendment rights in public universities deserve greater protection than primary and secondary student 
speech.”). 
87  McCauley, 618 F.3d at 242; see also Wirmani, supra note 81, at 784 (noting that the Tinker test was 
“articulated with primary and secondary students in mind”). 
88  McCauley, 618 F.3d at 242; DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316. 
89  Lindsay, supra note 69, at 1473 (arguing that the Tinker standard “should be restricted to K-12 stu-
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Circuit has recognized that  
 
At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker . . . and other de-
cisions involving speech in public elementary and high 
schools, cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving 
public universities.  Any application of free speech doc-
trine derived from these decisions to the university set-
ting should be scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on 
the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.90 
 
For purposes of this analysis, this means that any restriction placed 
upon the speech and expression of intercollegiate student-athletes by 
a public university must at least satisfy the Tinker test, but quite pos-
sibly might be subjected to more searching inquiry based on the fact 
that the speech rights of college students are broader than those of 
high school students.91  With this background in mind, this Article 
now turns to an examination of the existing judicial precedents in 
this area. 
d. Existing Case Law on the First Amendment Rights of College 
Student-Athletes 
Notwithstanding the widespread media attention that the Missouri 
football players received for their boycott, activities of this sort are 
nothing new in the landscape of college football.  As early as 1948, 
the white players on the Lafayette College football team voted to re-
fuse an invitation to the Sun Bowl after learning that an African-
American teammate would not be allowed to play.92  There were 
                                                                                                                                      
dent speech, not extended to adults at the post-secondary level”); Wirmani, supra note 81, at 784 (as-
serting that Tinker’s substantial disruption test “should not be applied at the university level”); cf. Mi-
chael Kent Curtis, Be Careful What You Wish For: Gays, Dueling High School T-Shirts, and the Perils 
of Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431, 460 (2009) (acknowledging that “[t]hough the college 
cases often relied on Tinker, free speech protection in public colleges and universities has been more 
robust and less subject to erosion than in high school”); but see Outspoken, supra note 36, at 513 n.9, 
525–26, 543 & n.193, 546 (arguing that the Tinker test provides an inadequate framework in the context 
of college athlete speech rights because it is not deferential enough to university coaches and adminis-
trators, and advocating an analytical model similar to that employed by the Court in cases involving 
military personnel); Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 54–55 (same). 
90  McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010). 
91  See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
92  Les Carpenter, The forgotten story of . . . the Pennsylvania college that took on a southern bowl’s 
racism, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/dec/23/lafayette-sun-
  
2016] PICKING UP THE FLAG 59 
 
“dozens, if not hundreds of disturbances within college football in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s,” often involving African-American 
athletes clashing with white coaches over ill-treatment, discipline, 
and lack of sensitivity to their needs.93  For instance, at Syracuse 
University in 1970, several African-American football players staged 
a walkout during spring practice, demanding that the head football 
coach hire an African-American assistant as he had previously prom-
ised.94  To solve the conflict, the head coach hired an African-
American assistant, but then threw seven players who had participat-
ed in the walkout off of the team.95  Around the same time, three Af-
rican-American players at the University of Washington quit the 
football team in the middle of the season and then held a press con-
ference denouncing the racial practices of the coaching staff.96  In 
1969, African-American players at Eastern Washington University 
protested, but did not boycott, the banning of the black power sa-
lute.97  In 1988, University of Kentucky football players threatened 
to go on strike if the school did not remove A.B. “Happy” Chandler, 
a university trustee who had used a racist slur during a public meet-
ing.98  The players backed down after the governor of Kentucky ex-
pressed his support for Chandler.99 
Despite the long history of player unrest and expressive activity, 
the issue of the First Amendment rights of intercollegiate athletes has 
seldom been litigated in court.100  “Historically, the courts have heard 
only a minimal amount of cases addressing the First Amendment 
whether generally or specifically as to freedom of speech and expres-
sion that concerned educational participants involved with athlet-
ics.”101  The jurisprudence that has been produced tends to reflect the 
                                                                                                                                      
bowl-forgotten-story. 
93  Strachan, supra note 35. 
94  Nicole Hemmer, Missouri Football Players Took a Risky Stand Against Racism With Strike, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/nicole-
hemmer/2015/11/10/missouri-football-players-took-a-risky-stand-against-racism-with-strike. 
95  Id.; see also Strachan, supra note 35. 
96  Hemmer, supra note 94. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id.  Mr. Chandler was a former governor of Kentucky himself, as well as a United States Senator, 
and also served as the Commissioner of Major League Baseball from 1945-1951.  Happy Chandler, 
NAT’L BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, http://baseballhall.org/hof/chandler-happy (last visited Feb. 14, 
2016). 
100  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 549. 
101  Heckman, supra note 58, at 48. Professor Penrose posits that the reason the issue is so infrequently 
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reality described above that student-athletes are subject to greater 
regulation than ordinary students.102  Where the courts have stepped 
in to protect the expressive rights of intercollegiate student-athletes, 
the expressions tended to “have value beyond the individual speak-
er.”103  Cases involving “ordinary speech . . . seem[] to favor team 
over individual, coach over player, and state over citizen.”104 
i. Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka105   
Hysaw is perhaps the most often-cited case involving the First 
Amendment rights of intercollegiate student-athletes.  The plaintiffs 
in Hysaw were African-American scholarship athletes on the Wash-
burn University football team.106  Plaintiffs claimed that they were 
being treated in a racially discriminatory manner by the coaching 
staff and school administration.  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that 
the promises of their full scholarships had not been carried out and 
that lesser white players on the team had received better scholarships 
than some of the African-American players.107  Dissatisfied with the 
school’s response to their concerns, plaintiffs boycotted several pre-
season practices.108  The athletic director warned plaintiffs that miss-
ing practice without a coach’s excuse was a violation of disciplinary 
rules and would be treated as an unexcused absence.109  He informed 
them that they would only be allowed to keep their scholarships if 
they apologized to the team and school administration, participated 
in five early morning practices, sat out the first game of the season, 
and exhibited total commitment to the football program.110  After 
plaintiffs refused to comply with these conditions, they were re-
                                                                                                                                      
litigated is because intercollegiate student-athletes recognize the choice between receiving the various 
privileges associated with participation in intercollegiate athletics and receiving the full panoply of First 
Amendment rights. See Outspoken, supra note 36, at 526, 548–50. If a student-athlete chooses to be 
outspoken, he or she can accept the consequences and opt for speech over athletics. Id. at 523, 526.  
However, the vast majority of student-athletes find the experiences of participating in intercollegiate 
athletics well worth the limited sacrifice of receiving “a watered-down version of First Amendment 
rights.” Id. at 550. 
102  Outspoken, supra note 36, at 545. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987). 
106  Id. at 942. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 942–43. 
109  Id. at 943. 
110  Id. 
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moved from the football team, but continued to receive financial aid 
for the remainder of the academic year.111  Plaintiffs subsequently 
filed suit, claiming violation of their free speech, liberty, and proper-
ty rights, as well as breach of their contracts with the school.112 
The court granted summary judgment to the school on a number of 
plaintiffs’ claims, including their claims for violation of their proper-
ty rights and liberty interests, and their claim for breach of con-
tract.113  Plaintiffs had neither a property right, liberty interest, nor 
contractual right in playing college football.114  Their only interest 
was in their scholarships, and defendants had made all disbursements 
under those agreements.115  However, the court still had to consider 
plaintiffs’ contention that the school “violated their first amendment 
right to free speech by removing them from the team after they pro-
tested racial mistreatment.”116  The school defendants argued that the 
dismissal was justified as a reasonable time, place, and manner re-
striction under Tinker, because “the boycott severely disrupted the 
football team and infringed upon the rights of others participating in 
the football program.”117 
The court accepted Tinker as the applicable framework, but held 
that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment under its 
standard.  The head football coach had testified that if a player 
missed practice in order to protest racial mistreatment, he would be 
excused.118  The court determined that if this was, in fact, the policy, 
the application by the coaching staff of its own policy could not pos-
sibly cause a substantial disruption to the team.119  The court also 
adopted a narrow reading of “infringing upon the rights of others,” 
holding that this restriction on speech “was meant to apply only to 
activity which could result in tort liability for the school.”120  Plain-
                                                          
111  Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 943. 
112  Id. at 942. 
113  Id. at 944–47. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at  945–46; Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The government may not 
‘deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially 
his interest in freedom of speech’—even though the person has no right to the valuable government 
benefit and ‘even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons..”) (quot-
ing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
117  Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 946. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. (citing Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
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tiffs’ boycott may have made practice more difficult and hurt team 
morale and game play, but the team’s rights had not been infringed 
upon.121  The court refused to “place the interests of participants in a 
university extracurricular activity above the rights of any citizen to 
speak out against alleged racial injustice without fear of government 
retribution.”122  Because genuine issues of fact remained, summary 
judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ freedom of speech claim was 
inappropriate.123 
 
ii.  Williams v. Eaton124 
 
This case saw fourteen African-American football players at the 
University of Wyoming march into the office of head coach Lloyd 
Eaton, requesting that they be allowed to wear black armbands dur-
ing the school’s game against BYU the following afternoon in silent 
protest against the policy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, which operated BYU, that prohibited African-American men 
from entering its priesthood.125  Eaton had a team rule that football 
players could not participate in demonstrations or protests.126  Rather 
than granting permission, Eaton dismissed the players from the team, 
allegedly telling them that they could go play for a historically black 
                                                          
121  Id. 
122  Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 946. 
123  Id.  The court also denied defendants summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, on the basis that factual issues remained as to whether defendants had provided white players 
with equal or lesser abilities than African-American players more beneficial scholarship agreements and 
participation opportunities.  Id. at 944. 
124  443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971). 
125  Id. at 424; see also Sean Keeler, ‘We were villains’: how Wyoming’s Black 14 blazed the trail for 
Missouri protests, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/11/we-were-villains-how-wyomings-black-14-blazed-the-
trail-for-missouri-protests; Adam Kilgore, Echoes of the ‘Black 14’ still resonate, WASH. POST (Nov. 
11, 2015), available at 2015 WLNR 33491976; Strachan, supra note 35; Clinton Yates, Before Con-
cernedStudent1950 at Missouri, there was the Black 14 at Wyoming, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/11/10/before-theconcerned1950-at-
missouri-there-was-the-black-14-at-wyoming/.  The armbands were also in protest of certain unsports-
manlike acts allegedly perpetrated by BYU football players in previous contests.  See Williams, 443 
F.2d at 424. 
126  Williams, 443 F.2d at 424, 425.  Eaton had arrived at Wyoming in 1962 and built the program into a 
powerhouse over the course of the 1960s.  Keeler, supra note 125; Yates, supra note 125.  The team 
had won three straight Western Athletic Conference titles, achieved back-to-back 10-win seasons in 
1966 and 1967, and was coming off of a Sun Bowl victory over Florida State the season before.  Keeler, 
supra note 125; Kilgore, supra note 125; Yates, supra note 125.  As a national program, Wyoming had 
African-American players from all over the nation.  Yates, supra note 125.  Entering the contest against 
BYU, Wyoming was undefeated and ranked twelfth in the nation.  Keeler, supra note 125. 
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college program instead.127  After the university board of trustees 
sustained the dismissals, plaintiffs filed a civil rights action, alleging 
that their suspension from the football team for wearing the arm-
bands as a peaceful and symbolic demonstration violated, inter alia, 
their First Amendment rights.128 
Following the district court’s dismissal of the action, the Tenth 
Circuit considered “whether the complaint stated any claim for relief 
under the First Amendment and Federal constitutional decisions on 
freedom of expression.”129  The court applied Tinker in analyzing the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.130  The court interpreted the dis-
trict court’s dismissal as a grant of summary judgment to the defend-
ants and held that “[i]n the light of the principles of the Tinker case 
and similar authorities, we cannot say that the complaint fails to state 
a claim on which relief could be granted or that summary judgment 
was proper.”131  Specifically, the court found no showing that plain-
tiffs’ conduct “likely would produce any disturbance interfering with 
school discipline or the interests which the authorities are entitled to 
protect, under the principles of the Tinker case.”132  The statements 
and findings relied upon by the district court simply did not establish 
“that there was or would have been any material disruption of class 
work, substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others as to jus-
tify a summary judgment against the plaintiffs.”133  Thus, the case 
was reversed and remanded. 
After the case was brought to trial on remand, the district court 
again ruled in favor of the defendants.134  The district court reasoned 
that the armband display by student-athletes at a state university 
would violate state and federal constitutional provisions mandating 
complete neutrality on religious matters by expressing opposition to 
                                                          
127  Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 424–25 (10th Cir. 1971); Kilgore, supra note 125; Strachan, supra 
note 35; Yates, supra note 125. 
128  Williams, 443 F.2d at 424, 425. 
129  Id. at 426–27. 
130  Id. at 430. 
131  Id. at 431, 432. 
132  Id. at 431. 
133  Id. at 431 n.6.  The court further found that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm from their dis-
missal from the team “in that their ability to promote their careers, practice and perform their skills has 
been denied them,” and they had lost “their chance to be observed by scouts as potential professional 
football players during the 1969 season,” which had resulted in “emotional and mental stress and anxie-
ty,” regardless of whether their scholarship agreements “had been continued in force subject to further 
review.” Id. at 431–32. 
134  Keeler, supra note 125. 
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the religious beliefs of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints.135  This time, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s rul-
ing, finding that the defendants’ actions constituted a reasonable reg-
ulation of expression under Tinker.136  The court emphasized that its 
holding was not based “on the presence of any violence or disrup-
tion.  There was no showing or finding to that effect and the trial 
court’s conclusions of law state that the denial of the right to wear 
the armbands during the game ‘. . . was not predicated upon the like-
lihood of disruption, although such a demonstration might have tend-
ed to create disruption.’”137  Rather, the trustees’ decision was lawful 
under Tinker because 
 
Their decision protected against invasion of the rights of 
others by avoiding a hostile expression to them by some 
members of the University team.  It was in furtherance 
of the policy of religious neutrality by the State.  It de-
nied only the request for the armband display by some 
members of the team, on the field and during the game.  
In these limited circumstances we conclude that the 
Trustees’ decision was in conformity with the Tinker 
case and did not violate the First Amendment right of 
expression of the plaintiffs.”138 
iii.  Green v. Sandy139   
In this matter, plaintiff received an athletic scholarship to partici-
pate on the women’s soccer team at Eastern Kentucky University.140  
During her junior year, plaintiff became concerned with the team’s 
                                                          
135  Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1972). 
136  Id. at 1084. 
137  Id. 
138  Id.  While Coach Eaton and the university experienced success in the courtroom, the incident had a 
significantly negative effect on their fortunes on the football field.  Eaton was fired after going 1-9 in 
1970 and ended up as a scout for the Green Bay Packers.  Keeler, supra note 125; Kilgore, supra note 
125.  The program lost its ability to recruit African-American players.  Kilgore, supra note 125.  After 
playing in five bowl games and never posting a losing record from 1950-1969, Wyoming produced only 
four winning seasons and one postseason appearance from 1970-1986.  Keeler, supra note 125.  Even 
almost fifty years later, the program still has not matched the heights it reached in the late 1960s.  Kil-
gore, supra note 125. 
139  No. 5:10-cv-367-JMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2011). 
140  Id. at *3. 
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management and retention rate.141  After an unsatisfactory meeting 
with her coach, plaintiff presented her complaints and recommenda-
tions to the school athletic director, who promised to investigate.142  
Plaintiff was subsequently dismissed from the soccer team, although 
she continued to receive financial aid during her senior year.143  
Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that she had been removed from the team 
in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech 
when she had expressed her concerns regarding the soccer coach’s 
handling of internal team matters, including player attendance, reten-
tion, and study requirements.144 
In dismissing plaintiff’s claims, the court appeared to apply the 
Tinker standard, without actually citing Tinker.145  The court recog-
nized that “a student-athlete’s expression of dissatisfaction with her 
team or coach causes great harm to team unity and therefore consti-
tutes a disruption and disturbance which school officials have a right 
to prevent.”146  Nor are schools and coaches “obligated to wait until a 
student-athlete’s complaints would create disruption,” or “required to 
actually demonstrate it was certain the complaints would create dis-
ruption.”147  Schools and their coaches need only show that “it was 
reasonable for them to forecast that the complaints at issue would 
disrupt the team. . . . [Q]uestions of whether disruption actually oc-
curred or whether the school could actually prove disruption are not 
questions that prevent dismissal as a matter of law.”148  As long as a 
student-athlete’s regular education is not impeded, she may continue 
her campaign against the coach, but she is not free to “continue to 
play the sport for that coach while actively working to undermine the 
coach’s authority.”149  Because the coach and school administrators 
could reasonably have forecast that the plaintiff’s criticisms of the 
coach’s methods and decisions would disrupt the soccer team, they 
                                                          
141  Id. 
142  Id. at *3–4. 
143  Id. at *5–6.  The athletic department investigation of the women’s soccer team did not reveal any 
improper conduct by the head coach.  Id. 
144  Id. at *13–14. 
145  The court relied on a Sixth Circuit decision, Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007), 
which, as seen infra, applied the Tinker standard.  See Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718, at *15–
16. 
146  Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at *15–16. 
149  Id. at *16. 
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were “well within their rights” to dismiss her from the team.150 
 
iv.  Marcum v. Dahl151 
 
In Marcum v. Dahl, plaintiffs received athletic scholarships and 
participated on the University of Oklahoma women’s basketball team 
during the 1977-78 school year.152  At some point during the basket-
ball season, a split developed within the team, with the scholarship 
players disapproving of the head coach based on her lifestyle and 
“shoving aside” of a better and more competent assistant coach, to 
the detriment of the team.153  The plaintiffs took their grievances to 
the athletic department administration during the season.154  After the 
last game of the season, plaintiffs commented to the press that if the 
head coach returned the following year, they would not play.155  The 
women’s athletic director subsequently notified plaintiffs that their 
scholarships would not be renewed for the upcoming year, based up-
on their attitude and behavior.156  Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming the 
decision not to renew their scholarships was motivated by their con-
stitutionally-protected statements to the press, and thus violated their 
First Amendment rights.157 
Unlike Hysaw, Williams, and Sandy, which all applied the Tinker 
test, the Tenth Circuit in this case analogized plaintiffs to govern-
ment employees and applied the test set forth in Pickering v. Board 
of Education of Township High School District 205,158 which con-
cerns the discharge of public employees for exercising their First 
Amendment rights.159  Under Pickering, the court upheld the district 
                                                          
150  Id. 
151  658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981). 
152  Id. at 733. 
153  Id.  On the other hand, the non-scholarship players fully supported the head coach.  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id.  
157  Marcum, 658 F.2d at 733, 734. 
158  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
159  See Marcum, 658 F.2d at 734.  The Pickering test requires a court to balance  “the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”  
Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
568).  However, in order to warrant such balancing, the public employee’s speech must touch upon a 
matter of public concern.  Id. at 766.  “[A] public employer may constitutionally suppress an employ-
ee’s speech addressing ‘matters only of personal interest’—such as personnel matters pertaining to the 
speaker’s job performance or terms and conditions of employment—in order to promote an efficient 
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court’s holding that plaintiffs’ comments to the press were not con-
stitutionally protected by the First Amendment because they “did not 
involve matters of public concern.”160  Rather, “[t]he problems creat-
ed by the controversy between the scholarship and non-scholarship 
players were internal problems . . . . Such matters are not of general 
public concern and the plaintiffs’ comments to the press did not in-
voke First Amendment protection.”161  Plaintiffs’ participation in the 
controversy and statements to the press resulted in disharmony and 
disruption among the team and provided a sufficient basis for the 
non-renewal of their scholarships.162  Thus, “the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights were not violated by the defendants’ refusal to re-
new the plaintiffs’ athletic scholarships.”163 
v.  Richard v. Perkins164   
In Richard, plaintiff received an athletic scholarship from the Uni-
versity of Kansas to participate as a horizontal jumper on the men’s 
track team.165  Following plaintiff’s freshman year, his coach decided 
not to renew his scholarship based on an alleged act of disrespect.166  
Plaintiff appealed that decision and the school reversed the coach’s 
decision and reinstated plaintiff’s scholarship for the upcoming 
school year.167  However, prior to plaintiff’s sophomore season, his 
coach excluded him from the team picture, expelled him from the 
team, and barred him from using the team’s training facilities.168  
Plaintiff alleged that his successful appeal of the initial non-renewal 
                                                                                                                                      
workplace and the effective delivery of public services.” Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147 (1983)).  Only employee speech touching on matters of public concern is entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.  Id.  In light of the uncertainty over whether a college student-athlete constitutes a uni-
versity employee, several cases and commentators have criticized the application of the Pickering test 
to the unique setting of college athletics.  See e.g., Pinard, 467 F.3d at 766 n.16 (finding the relationship 
between students and public school officials insufficiently similar to that between a government em-
ployer and employee to justify imposition of the Pickering test); Outspoken, supra note 36, at 541; but 
see Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 597 (6th Cir. 2007) (analogizing the greater restrictions imposed 
on student-athletes to the greater restrictions imposed on government employees and determining that 
“legal principles from the government employment context are relevant to the instant case”). 
160  Marcum, 658 F.2d at 734. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. at 734–35. 
164  373 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Kan. 2005). 
165  Id. at 1215. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
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decision constituted an exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 
his subsequent expulsion constituted retaliation for this constitution-
ally-protected conduct in violation of the First Amendment.169 
Unlike Marcum, the court declined to apply the Pickering test, 
since it did not consider plaintiff, as a student-athlete, to be an em-
ployee of defendants.170  Instead, the court applied the test set forth 
in Worrell v. Henry171 for dealing with First Amendment retaliation 
claims.172  Pursuant to the Worrell test, “plaintiff must allege that (1) 
he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) defendants 
caused him to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary 
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) defend-
ants’ action was substantially motivated by his exercise of constitu-
tionally protected conduct.”173 
Plaintiff failed to establish the first prong of the analysis.  While 
free speech is clearly a constitutionally-protected right, plaintiff had 
to “show that his speech or petition touched upon matters of public 
concern.”174  Plaintiff’s appeal of the decision not to renew his schol-
arship merely sought redress for his private rights.175  Therefore, be-
cause plaintiff was not engaged in a constitutionally-protected activi-
ty, he could not state a First Amendment retaliation claim, and 
defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings.176 
B.  Freedom of Speech in the Context of Interscholastic Athletics 
Because the regulation of speech by intercollegiate student-athletes 
may very well be subject to a different standard than the regulation 
of speech by interscholastic student-athletes, see supra at 12-16, cas-
es arising in the high school context may be of limited precedential 
value to situations such as the one at Missouri.177  Still, because the 
results of these cases tend to be consistent with the college cases in 
upholding “a school’s right to prohibit and punish speech that causes 
dissension or disruption on the team,” they may offer some guidance 
                                                          
169  Id. at 1215–16. 
170  Richard, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.  None of the parties alleged that plaintiff’s scholarship contract 
with the university established an employment relationship.  Id. at 1217 n.2. 
171  219 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). 
172  Richard, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  See Tinkering with Success, supra note 36, at 53–54. 
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on the subject.178  Several of the leading high school cases are dis-
cussed below. 
1. Boyd v. Bd. of Dirs. of McGehee Sch. Dist. No. 17179 
In Boyd, twenty-five African-American high school football play-
ers walked out of a pep rally and refused to participate in the game 
scheduled for that night in protest of an act of racial discrimination in 
the selection of the school’s homecoming queen.180  The white head 
football coach had allegedly manipulated the election so that a white 
candidate, rather than an African-American candidate, won.181  The 
players were subsequently suspended from participating on the foot-
ball team for the remainder of the season.182  One of the suspended 
players subsequently brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim-
ing that his suspension constituted an infringement of his First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression.183  The defendants coun-
tered that plaintiff had not been suspended for exercising his First 
Amendment rights, but rather for the violation of an unwritten team 
rule mandating the suspension of any player who missed a game or 
practice without good cause of proper excuse.184 
The court applied Tinker’s substantial disruption standard without 
citing Tinker itself.185  The court found that plaintiff and his African-
American teammates “had reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
coach had purposely manipulated the election for homecoming queen 
in order to preclude the African-American candidate from winning, 
based on her race and color.186  After appealing unsuccessfully to 
both the coach and school board, “the black players were left without 
any recourse other than what Americans, from the very inception of 
this Republic, regard as fundamental and basic in a democracy, 
namely, ‘freedom of expression,’ when peaceful and in good order, 
                                                          
178  See Outspoken, supra note 36, at 545 n.199. 
179  612 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark. 1985). 
180  Id. at 89. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 88, 89.  Another suspended player later intervened in the action as well.  Id. at 90 n.4. 
184  Id. at 89–90. 
185  Boyd, 612 F. Supp. at 92. Instead, the court relied on Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 
1966), a Fifth Circuit decision itself quoted in Tinker.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749); Boyd, 612 F. Supp. at 92 (quoting 
same language from Burnside quoted in Tinker.). 
186  Boyd, 612 F. Supp. at 91. 
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to communicate views on questions of group interest.”187  The play-
ers’ actions in walking out of the pep rally and refusing to participate 
in a scheduled game were “without any substantial intrusion of the 
work and discipline of the school.”188   
Moreover, the court refused to accord the coach’s unwritten team 
rule requiring suspension of players who missed practices or games 
without good cause or excuse precedence “over a student’s right of 
free expression.”189  Such a subjective policy “can neither frustrate 
nor chill the First Amendment rights of students. . . . Peaceful protest 
by students . . . may not be contingent upon the controlled will of the 
head coach.”190  Thus, plaintiff had established that his conduct was 
constitutionally protected and the motivating factor in his suspension 
from the team.191 
2.  Seamons v. Snow192 
In this case, the plaintiff football player was assaulted by five 
teammates in the locker room in some sort of hazing incident.193  Af-
ter plaintiff reported the incident to school administrators and other 
authorities, the football coach accused him of “betraying the team” 
and demanded that plaintiff apologize to the team.194  When plaintiff 
refused to apologize, the coach dismissed him from the team.195  
Plaintiff sued, claiming the school defendants violated his First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech by removing him from the 
team “because he refused to apologize for informing authorities of 
the incident.”196 
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the First Amendment 
claim, the Tenth Circuit applied the Tinker standard.197  The court 
found plaintiff’s speech “responsibly tailored to the audience of 
school administrators, coaches, family and participants who needed 
                                                          
187  Id. at 92. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. at 92–93. 
191  Id. at 92.  The court awarded plaintiff nominal damages for deprivation of his federal rights, as well 
as punitive damages based on the coach’s “willful, malicious and conscious indifference” to plaintiff’s 
federal constitutional rights, as well as the coach’s “invidious racial discriminatory action toward the 
black players.”  Id. at 94. 
192  84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). 
193  Id. at 1230. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  Id. at 1236. 
197  Id. at 1237. 
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to know about the incident.”198  Plaintiff’s speech “neither disrupted 
classwork nor invaded the rights of other students.”199  There was 
“no overriding school interest in denying [plaintiff] the ability to re-
port physical assaults in the locker room.”200  At most, the school had 
shown “fear of a disturbance stemming from the disapproval associ-
ated with [plaintiff’s] unpopular viewpoint regarding hazing in the 
school’s locker rooms,” which, under Tinker, “is not a sufficient jus-
tification to punish [plaintiff’s] speech in these circumstances.”201  
Therefore, plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his First 
Amendment rights.202 
3.  Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J203 
In Pinard, the plaintiff basketball players found their head coach 
“verbally abusive and highly intimidating.”204 Following one game, 
the coach “told the players that if they wanted him to quit, they 
should say so, and he would resign.”205  The players took him up on 
his offer, typed up a petition requesting that the coach resign, and de-
livered it to him prior to the next game.206  The players subsequently 
refused to board the bus for that night’s away game.207  Although the 
coach resigned, the school permanently suspended the players from 
the team.208  Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that they had been pun-
ished for complaining about the coach in violation of the First 
Amendment.209 
After the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the district court had 
improperly applied the Pickering test to plaintiffs’ speech, when 
Tinker constituted the proper standard for analyzing student 
speech.210  Under Tinker, the district court should have focused on 
the effect of plaintiffs’ speech on school activities and the rights of 
                                                          
198  Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1238. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  Id. at 1237. 
203  467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006). 
204  Id. at 760. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. at 760, 761. 
207  Id. at 762. 
208  Id. 
209  Pinard, 467 F.3d at 763. 
210  Id. at 765. 
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others, not whether it touched upon a matter of public concern.211  
Finding Tinker to be a flexible standard, the Ninth Circuit examined 
the totality of the circumstances, focusing not just on plaintiffs’ ac-
tions, but also on all of the circumstances facing the defendant school 
officials at the time.212  This examination revealed that plaintiffs’ pe-
tition “neither disrupted school activities nor impinged on the rights 
of other students.”213  Therefore, plaintiffs’ speech was protected by 
the First Amendment.214 
The court, however, reached a different conclusion as to plaintiffs’ 
refusal to board the bus for the away game.  Even if that conduct 
constituted expressive speech, the court found that the boycott of the 
game “substantially disrupted and materially interfered with a school 
activity.”215  Specifically, the boycott materially disrupted the opera-
tion of the varsity basketball team.216  The court noted that “school 
districts spend much time and money scheduling and hosting extra-
curricular activities—part of the school’s educational program—
which involve the coordination of multiple school officials, students, 
parents and often times volunteers, referees and bus drivers.”217  The 
boycotted game was a regularly scheduled out of town game and 
plaintiffs had refused to board the bus only a few hours before the 
game was to begin.218  The last minute boycott by virtually every 
member of the team forced the school to either find replacement 
players or cancel the event.219  Based on the totality of the circum-
stances, plaintiffs’ conduct in refusing to board the bus interrupted 
school activities and intruded on the school’s affairs.220  Under Tink-
er, the school defendants could properly discipline plaintiffs for this 
                                                          
211  Id. at 766–67 & n.18.  Even if the plaintiffs’ speech were required to touch upon a matter of public 
concern, the court found this standard met, since plaintiffs’ criticisms of their coach “were related to 
various issues of ‘concern to the community,’ including the school’s performance of its duties to super-
vise its teachers, monitor extracurricular activities and provide a safe and appropriate learning environ-
ment for its students.”  Id. at 767 n.18. 
212  Id. at 768 (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Karp v. Becken, 
477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
213  Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 769. 
216  Id. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  Pinard, 467 F.3d at 769–70.  The school ultimately used junior varsity players in place of the boy-
cotting varsity players, and lost the game by more than 50 points.  Id. at 762. 
220  Id. at 770. 
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disruptive expressive conduct.221 
4.  Lowery v. Euverard222 
Plaintiffs in this case were members of their high school football 
team who became dissatisfied with their coach’s alleged verbal and 
physical abuse over the course of the season.223  Plaintiffs typed up a 
petition stating that they hated their coach and did not want to play 
for him, circulated the petition to other players to sign, and intended 
to present the petition to the school principal after the season in order 
to get the coach replaced.224  The coach, however, learned of the pe-
tition during the season, and attempted to question the players.225  
When plaintiffs proved uncooperative in response to the coach’s 
questioning, they were dismissed from the team and encouraged oth-
er players to leave with them.226  Plaintiffs sued, contending that 
their First Amendment rights were violated when they were dis-
missed from the team for circulating the petition.227 
In reviewing the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit applied the Tinker test, but rec-
ognized that school officials do not have to wait for a disruption of 
school activities to actually occur before restricting student 
speech.228  Nor does Tinker require certainty that the disruption will 
occur; rather, “only that the forecast of substantial disruption be rea-
sonable.”229  Accordingly, defendants “were not obligated to wait un-
til the petition substantially disrupted the team before acting, nor are 
they now required to demonstrate that it was certain that the petition 
would substantially disrupt the team.”230  All they had to show was 
                                                          
221  Id. 
222  497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
223  Id. at 585.  The coach allegedly “struck a player in the helmet, threw away college recruiting letters 
to disfavored players, humiliated and degraded players, used inappropriate language, and required a 
year-round conditioning program in violation of high school rules.” Id. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. at 586. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 587. 
228  Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591–92 (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the horse has left 
the barn before closing the door.”); see also Pinard, 467 F.3d at 767 n.17 (“Tinker does not require 
school officials to wait until disruption or interference actually occurs before suppressing student 
speech…”). 
229  Lowery, 497 F.3d at 592. 
230  Id. at 593. 
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that “it was reasonable for them to forecast that the petition would 
disrupt the team.”231 
The court determined that the defendants had made the required 
showing.  The petition circulated by plaintiffs “was a direct chal-
lenge to [their coach’s] authority, and undermined his ability to lead 
the team.”232  It also threatened team unity.233  Accordingly, “it was 
reasonable for Defendants to believe that the petition would disrupt 
the team, by eroding [the coach’s] authority and dividing players into 
opposing camps.”234  The court found this belief bolstered by plain-
tiffs’ insubordinate and disruptive acts when questioned about the 
petition.235  Because defendants reasonably forecasted that plaintiffs’ 
petition would cause substantial disruption to the football team, their 
speech was not protected under Tinker and defendants did not violate 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by removing them from the 
team.236 
II.   APPLICATION OF PRECEDENTS TO MISSOURI SITUATION 
Applying the legal background and relevant precedents to the situ-
ation at Missouri, it appears quite unlikely that the University of 
Missouri would have been able to penalize the football players for 
their boycott.  Based on existing case law—particularly Hysaw and 
Williams—a court would likely analyze plaintiffs’ speech under the 
Tinker test, as opposed to the Pickering test,237 even though highly 
                                                          
231  Id. 
232  Id. at 594. 
233  Id. 
234  Id. at 596. 
235  Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596. 
236  Id.  The court concluded its analysis by observing that “Tinker does not . . . require coaches to sur-
render control of the team to players.”  Id. at 601; see also Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 
F.3d 768, 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff girls’ bas-
ketball player’s First Amendment claim based on her dismissal from team for refusing to apologize for 
circulating letter to teammates asking them to unite in defiance of the coach). 
237  Courts continue to struggle with the issue of whether student-athletes constitute employees of their 
schools.  See, e.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:14-cv-1710-WTL-MJD, slip op., at 
18 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016) (concluding that plaintiffs’ participation on their school’s athletic teams 
did not make them employees of the school for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Nw. Univ., 
362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 (Aug. 17, 2015) (declining to determine whether scholarship players consti-
tute statutory employees).  However, even if a court were to apply the Pickering test, the players’ 
speech here concerning race relations on campus would likely be construed as touching upon matters of 
public concern, rather than the internal team problems that justified restrictions on athletes’ speech in 
cases such as Marcum, and would therefore be protected.  See Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734–35 
(10th Cir. 1981). 
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persuasive reasons exist for subjecting the speech of college student-
athletes to a more deferential analysis than that accorded high school 
athletes under Tinker.238  Accordingly, any discipline imposed on the 
Missouri football players for their speech must meet the Tinker 
standard at a minimum, and could be subjected to a standard more 
deferential to student speech.  If the discipline could not survive even 
the Tinker standard, then there would be no reason to speculate 
whether it could survive some alternative standard more favorable to 
college students. 
Given the reasons for the boycott, the Missouri situation seems 
more akin to the situations where the student-athletes’ speech has 
“value beyond the individual speaker,” and thus more likely to be 
constitutionally protected.239  The case most analogous to the present 
situation is Hysaw, which also involved a boycott of practice by 
football players in order to protest racial injustice.  Key to the Hysaw 
court’s holding was the deposition testimony by the head football 
coach which stated that absences from practice in order to protest ra-
cial mistreatment would be excused.240  The court reasoned that an 
absence sanctioned by the coaching staff could not be construed as 
materially disruptive or substantially interfering with the operation of 
the team under Tinker.241   
This consideration is even stronger at Missouri, where the head 
football coach, Gary Pinkel,242 remained unequivocally supportive of 
his players throughout the entire process.  The day after the players 
announced the boycott, Pinkel gave them his full backing, tweeting 
the following:  “The Mizzou Family stands as one.  We are united.  
We are behind our players.  #ConcernedStudent1950  GP.”243  At a 
                                                          
238  See supra pp. 12–16.  
239  See Outspoken, supra note 36, at 545. 
240  Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987). 
241  Id. 
242  Mere days after the players ended their boycott, Pinkel announced his resignation as head football 
coach due to health issues.  Gary Pinkel has lymphoma, is resigning from Missouri, ESPN (Nov. 13, 
2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/14122405/coach-gary-pinkel-resigning-missouri-
tigers-health-reasons-cited.  The current head football coach at Missouri is Barry Odom, who served as 
defensive coordinator for the team in 2015.  Tod Palmer, Barry Odom will succeed Gary Pinkel as Mis-
souri’s football coach, KANSAS CITY STAR (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/sec/university-of-missouri/article47884155.html. 
243  Michael McLaughlin, Missouri Football Coach Backs Away From Student Activists, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 10, 2015), available at 2015 WLNR 33468030; Winsor, supra note 3; see also Maese & 
Babb, supra note 6.  Pinkel included with his tweet a group photo of football players and coaches 
locked arm in arm.  Maese & Babb, supra note 6.  While Pinkel remained steadfast in his support of his 
players, he subsequently distanced himself from ConcernedStudent1950, the student activist group be-
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news conference on Monday, November 9, 2015, Pinkel stated, 
“[The players] had tears in their eyes and asked if I would support 
them and I said I would—it’s about supporting my players when they 
needed me.  I did the right thing and I would do it again.”244  The 
team itself maintained a united front, again making it difficult to see 
how the actions could cause a substantial disruption.245  Finally, the 
athletic department itself took a very deferential stance, releasing a 
statement that “[w]e must all come together with leaders from across 
our campus to tackle these challenging issues and we support our 
student-athletes’ right to do so.”246  In light of the above considera-
tions, it is unlikely that a court would deem the players’ speech and 
conduct in boycotting practice likely to constitute a material and sub-
stantial disruption.  Nor is there any evidence the players’ actions 
would infringe upon the rights of others under the narrow construc-
tion of this consideration set forth in Hysaw.247  The players’ speech 
would, therefore, be entitled to protection under the First Amend-
ment, and they could not be removed or suspended from the team, 
have their scholarships terminated or not renewed, or otherwise be 
penalized by the school for exercising their constitutional rights. 
A final issue is the proper scope of inquiry for purposes of finding 
a substantial disruption.  Many of the cases speak in terms of wheth-
er the challenged speech had or was likely to cause a material disrup-
tion on the particular team of which the plaintiff was a member.  For 
                                                                                                                                      
hind the campus demonstrations.  He claimed that the hashtag included with his tweet, which had sug-
gested he was supportive of the group, had been wrongly inserted by the assistant who helps manage his 
Twitter account.  See McLaughlin, supra note 243.  Pinkel stated that he did not support the group, and 
refused to comment on President Wolfe’s resignation, maintaining that he had only acted to support his 
players.  Id. (“This was strictly about me supporting my players and nothing else.”). 
244 Ferner, supra note 1; McLaughlin, supra note 243. 
245  This is in sharp contrast to the situation at Wyoming in Williams, where the plaintiffs had no support 
from any of the white players or coaches on the team.  Kilgore, supra note 125.  However, there did 
appear to be some cracks in the seemingly united front.  An anonymous player informed ESPN on the 
second night of the boycott that the entire team was not, in fact, united over the decision to stop practic-
ing.  McMurphy, supra note 1.  According to this player, “As much as we want to say everyone is unit-
ed, half the team and coaches—black and white—are pissed… If we were 9-0, this wouldn’t be happen-
ing.”  Id.  The player continued, “Not everyone agrees with the decision [to stop all football activities] . 
. . Most people are pissed, including the black guys [on the team].”  Id. (brackets in original); see also 
Cindy Boren, Missouri player says many players, coaches don’t back boycott of practices, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/11/09/missouri-player-says-
many-players-coaches-dont-back-boycott-of-practices/.  If these assertions were in fact true, it would 
significantly increase the likelihood of a court finding a substantial disruption in the operation of the 
football team and permit the school to discipline the student-athletes under Tinker.  
246  Maese & Babb, supra note 6. 
247  See Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987). 
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instance, Hysaw and Lowery discussed whether the plaintiffs’ speech 
caused a material disruption to their particular program.248  As dis-
cussed above, based upon the complete public support of the head 
coach and other players, as well as the deference shown by the ath-
letic department, it is unlikely that the players’ conduct constituted a 
material disruption of the Missouri football team. 
On the other hand, Williams and Pinard speak in terms of the in-
terruption and intrusion caused by plaintiffs’ conduct on the activi-
ties and affairs of the school as a whole.249  Even if there was no dis-
ruption to the team itself, the boycott was part of a larger movement 
of campus-wide demonstrations, which one could argue caused a 
substantial disruption to the operations of the university as a whole.  
However, Pinard noted that the school defendants could not disci-
pline the plaintiffs for their petition unless they could have “‘forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties’ as a result of the petition or complaints.”250  Thus, it seems 
plausible that a causation standard may be read into the Tinker test.  
At least as to situations in which a disruption has actually occurred, 
student-athlete speech may only be punished if it, in fact, caused the 
disruption.251  In this case, the campus-wide protests of the admin-
istration’s response to the ongoing racial issues on campus were un-
derway long before the players began their boycott.  Thus, any mate-
rial disruption to school activities was not a result of the players’ 
speech. 
In sum, even conceding that Tinker supplies the proper analytical 
framework, the Missouri football players’ speech and conduct is like-
ly protected under the First Amendment, since it is not reasonable to 
forecast a material disruption or substantial interference with either 
the operations of the team itself or the school under the circumstanc-
es of this case.  Since the speech is protected even under the constitu-
tional floor of Tinker, the school similarly would not be able to pe-
nalize the players under any even more deferential standard that may 
                                                          
248  See id. at 946; Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007). 
249  Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 431 n.6 (10th Cir. 1971); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 
F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). 
250  Pinard, 467 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original). 
251  Obviously, since schools do not have to wait for the disruption to occur, and may restrict speech 
under Tinker as long as it is reasonable to forecast a material disruption, Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 
584, 592 (6th Cir. 2007),  it may not always be feasible to conceive of causation in connection with 
Tinker.  Even so, it appears difficult to reasonably forecast a boycott as causing a substantial disruption 
on campus when that substantial disruption is already underway. 
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be more appropriate to speech cases arising in the college setting. 
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Finally, attention must be given to the implications of the Missouri 
situation on college sports in general, and—given its economic sig-
nificance—college football in particular.  Had the game against BYU 
been canceled, Missouri would have owed BYU $1 million pursuant 
to the schools’ contract.252  But the significance of the players’ ac-
tions resonates far beyond the economic impact of a single game.  
The campus demonstrations had been underway for some time.  
However, once the football players became involved, the momentum 
of the protests rapidly grew, and the school president resigned within 
two days.253  It makes sense that this should be so, given that the ath-
letic department is the most powerful institution at the school,254 and 
the football team its most powerful sport.255   
Nor are the Missouri players the only ones who have protested in 
recent years.  In March 2015, University of Oklahoma football play-
ers walked out of spring practice and engaged in a silent march 
through campus after a video surfaced showing members of a univer-
sity fraternity singing a song containing racial slurs.256  In 2013, 
football players at Grambling State University staged a weeklong 
boycott over a variety of issues, including rundown facilities, un-
healthy locker room conditions, improperly cleaned uniforms, long 
bus trips to road games, and coaching changes.257  A majority of the 
players refused to board the bus to a road game against Jackson State 
                                                          
252  Maese & Babb, supra note 6; George Schroeder, How the Missouri football boycott could become a 
catalyst for more, USA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2015/11/09/missouri-football-players-boycott-college-
athlete-power-gary-pinkel-mack-rhoades/75489518. 
253  Schroeder, supra note 252. 
254  The Missouri athletic department took in revenue of $83.7 million in 2014, and made a $3.5 million 
profit.  Strachan, supra note 35. 
255  Id. 
256  Schroeder, supra note 252; Travis Waldron, How The Mizzou Protests Demonstrate The Power of 
College Athletes, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/missouri-
protests-college-athletes_us_5641fde6e4b0411d3072713d. 
257  Othor Cain, A United Front: Grambling State University football players send strong message, 
MISS. LINK (Oct. 24, 2013), http://themississippilink.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/October-24-
2013.pdf; Jackson St. to pursue legal action, ESPN, Oct. 23, 2013, http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/9864598/jackson-state-pursue-litigation-grambling-state-following-forfeit [hereinaf-
ter Jackson St.]; Associated Press, SWAC to punish Grambling, ESPN (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/print?id=9971404 [hereinafter SWAC]. 
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University, forcing the school to forfeit.258  The players finally ended 
their boycott on the advice of their former head coach, who put them 
in contact with a local businessman who promised he would help 
fund updated facilities.259  The university president indicated that the 
players would face no repercussions for the boycott, as the national 
attention had helped publicize the school’s funding plight.260  Even 
in the immediate aftermath of the Missouri protests, the men’s bas-
ketball team at William Paterson University, a Division III school, 
walked off the court during pregame warmups—leaving their 
warmup shirts in a pile at the free throw line—to protest their long-
time head coach being forced out by the school administration, re-
sulting in a forfeit loss.261 
If the Missouri situation demonstrates anything, it is the power of 
student-athletes, particularly those in high profile sports, to affect so-
cial and political change on campus.  In the aftermath of the boycott, 
Charles Harris, a sophomore defensive end on the Missouri football 
team, stated, “Let this be a testament to all of the athletes across the 
country that you do have power.  It started with a few individuals on 
our team and look what it’s become.  Look where it’s at right now.  
This is nationally known, and it started with just a few.”262  This 
power is based on the economic impact student-athletes have on their 
universities.  Millions of dollars are invested in the labor of student-
athletes.263  As student-athletes, the players themselves are unable to 
make money, “but they . . . have the ability to make sure the school 
doesn’t either, should they refuse to play any given Saturday.”264   
                                                          
258  Cain, supra note 257; Jackson St., supra note 257.  The canceled game was Jackson State’s home-
coming, and the school claimed Grambling State’s failure to show up cost it and the city of Jackson 
millions of dollars. Jackson St., supra note 257.  The Southwestern Athletic Conference, of which both 
Grambling State and Jackson State are members, ultimately fined Grambling State an amount believed 
to be $20,000, required Grambling State to pay Jackson State an undisclosed amount from its future 
distributions, and required Grambling State to play at Jackson State the next three years in a row.  
SWAC, supra note 257. 
259  David Brandt, Grambling Ends Boycott With No Regrets, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 22, 
2013), available at 2013 WLNR 26490370. 
260  Cain, supra note 257. 
261  Jerry Carino, William Paterson players walk off court to support fired coach, ASBURY PARK PRESS 
(Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/sports/college/2015/11/24/william-paterson-players-walk-
off-court-protest/76353268/.  Because Division III schools do not offer athletic scholarships, the players 
had no scholarships to lose by refusing to play, id., although they still could have been suspended or 
dismissed from the team. 
262  Schroeder, supra note 252. 
263  Id. 
264  Strachan, supra note 35.  Louis Moore, an associate professor of history at Grand Valley State Uni-
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Given the power of intercollegiate student-athletes and the eco-
nomic stakes involved, the Missouri boycott may very well become a 
catalyst for similar actions by other college teams.265  If this is the 
case, one of the key factors in deciding whether the players’ speech 
is constitutionally protected will be the attitude of the coaching staff.  
As the court noted in Hysaw, it is hard to conceive how actions un-
dertaken with the complete support of the coaches can cause a mate-
rial disruption to the team.266  On the other hand, actions that do not 
have the support of the coaching staff are more likely to be reasona-
bly forecast to cause a material disruption, and less likely to receive 
constitutional protection. 
However, in further reflection of the true power of student-
athletes, at least in revenue sports like football and basketball, coach-
es may have no realistic choice but to support their players should a 
substantial number of them choose to engage in social or political ac-
tivism.  Some coaches, like Coach Pinkel, may genuinely support 
their players.  But even a coach that did not support his players’ ef-
forts would have to tread very lightly.  Taking a stand in opposition 
to the players may cause a coach to lose current players to transfer, 
and, if the protest concerns racial issues like at Missouri, the coach 
could lose his ability to effectively recruit African-American players 
in the future, all of which could lead to diminished results and ulti-
mately cost the coach his job.  For a cautionary tale, one need look 
no further than the impact on the Wyoming football team in the af-
termath of Williams v. Eaton.  The school and coach may have won 
the litigation, but it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory.  The football pro-
gram lost its ability to recruit African-American players, the coach 
soon lost his job, and a once successful team spent decades mired in 
mediocrity.267 
 In sum, the Missouri situation has provided intercollegiate stu-
dent-athletes a glimpse into their true power.  As this Article has 
shown, intercollegiate student-athletes at state schools who advocate 
for social and political change on their particular campus or in the 
broader world will know that in doing so, their coaches and schools 
                                                                                                                                      
versity agrees with this assessment, stating “So much is invested in [the athletes’] labor, we’re talking 
millions of dollars.  They have power.”  Id. 
265  Schroeder, supra note 252.  Indeed, in September 2015, before the Missouri boycott had even oc-
curred, the commissioner of the Big XII Conference had indicated that he would not be surprised if in-
tercollegiate student-athletes decided to strike in the near future.  Waldron, supra note 256. 
266  See Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987). 
267  See Keeler, supra note 125; Kilgore, supra note 125. 
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are unlikely to be able to constitutionally penalize them for exercis-
ing their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, unless, at a 
minimum, those officials can reasonably forecast a material disrup-
tion.  Moreover, the student-athletes may recognize the reality that 
coaches and school administrators may not even be willing to at-
tempt to impose such sanctions in light of the consequences it may 
have on the program in the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The recent boycott by football players at the University of Mis-
souri in protest of the school administration’s failure to adequately 
respond to issues of campus racism is the latest and perhaps most-
publicized incident in a long history of student-athletes exercising 
their constitutional right to express themselves on social and political 
issues.  Among the issues discussed in the ensuing media firestorm 
were the power of student-athletes to bring about change on their 
campuses, as well as what student-athletes’ growing self-awareness 
of this power may mean for the future of intercollegiate athletics.  
Lost in the background of this discussion, is whether a school or 
coach may penalize intercollegiate student-athletes for speaking out 
in this manner.  Fortunately for the football players at Missouri, they 
had the complete support of their head coach.  However, even if the 
university had sought to punish the student-athletes for their activity 
(perhaps along the lines of the bill proposed in the Missouri legisla-
ture), it is unlikely that such actions would withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  True, student-athletes are subject to greater restrictions on 
their speech than typical college students.  But even under the consti-
tutional floor provided by the Tinker test for analyzing the speech of 
high school students, the activity of the Missouri football players 
would likely be constitutionally protected in the absence of causing a 
material disruption.  Certainly, then, the activity would be similarly 
protected under a more deferential standard that arguably should ap-
ply when analyzing the speech of college students vis-à-vis high 
school students.  Knowledge of the legal framework may embolden 
intercollegiate student-athletes to continue to advocate for social and 
political change, knowing that their coaches and schools face signifi-
cant constitutional hurdles in penalizing them for the exercise of their 
First Amendment rights, and may not even have the will to attempt 
such action. 
 
